Impaired Driving Update – BC Edition: Volume 51

Welcome to British Columbia’s only weekly DUI law update newsletter. This newsletter contains the most cutting-edge information, the newest case law, and helpful practice tips for DUI defence in BC.

Authored by Kyla Lee, BC’s Impaired Driving Update is released weekly on Thursdays.

What’s inside:

  • Impaired Driving Defence Tip
  • IRP of the Week
  • Decision of the Week
  • Kyla’s Insight
  • Resources

1. Impaired Driving Defence Tip

Do not limit your investigation of a case to the disclosure package. The disclosure is the police account of the investigation. It is assembled by the same people whose conduct you are challenging in court. Some of the most important facts in a case may never appear in it. Investigate the police themselves.

Start with the names. Search every officer involved in the investigation on CanLII and in local news coverage. Look up their names on social media. Prior judicial findings about an officer’s credibility, note-taking or candour are fair game. Make a McNeil request for any findings of misconduct. For municipal police in BC, check the discipline decisions published by the Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner.

Then look for connections. Review the public social media of the officers and the key civilian witnesses. Look for links between the officers and the witnesses, the complainant, the tow operator or hospital staff. This matters most in smaller communities, where officers and witnesses are more likely to know each other. Keep this work to public sources. Do not send requests to private accounts or use a pretext to gain access.

Look at the timeline as well. Where it matters who did what and when, ask for duty rosters, shift schedules, and leave records.

A connection between an officer and a witness can go to the affiant’s duty of candour on a Garofoli application. It can support leave to cross-examine. It can go to the credibility and reliability of the witness at trial. It can ground an abuse of process application. You do not need to prove the witness lied.

2. IRP of the Week

The applicant was issued a 90-day driving prohibition after two approved screening device tests registered a FAIL.

The applicant spent the evening at a hookah lounge with friends. He drank three 473-millilitre cans of Stella Artois beer between approximately 1900 and 2200. He did not drink any alcohol after that. The friend who had driven him there was intoxicated. Shortly after 0100, the applicant agreed to move his friend’s car out of the parking lot to a side street, where it could stay overnight while they took an Uber. He drove approximately one hundred metres before the officer stopped him for driving without his lights on.

The officer read a mandatory alcohol screening demand. The first ASD test registered a FAIL. The applicant then provided a sample on a second device, which also registered a FAIL. The officer recorded the applicant’s answer to the question about his last drink as “1 beer at 7pm.” The applicant disputed the prohibition.

The applicant has had acid reflux for years. Carbonated drinks are one of his triggers. The beer and the hookah triggered his reflux at the lounge, and he burped stomach contents into his mouth repeatedly through the rest of the night. The reflux continued while he waited during the stop and while he blew into both devices. He tasted stomach acid and beer in his mouth as he provided each sample. English is not his first language. He understood the officer to be asking when he started drinking, and he answered with the time of his first beer.

Kyla Lee argued that the applicant’s blood alcohol content was less than 80 mg% even though the ASD registered a FAIL. The applicant gave detailed and consistent evidence of what he drank, when he drank it and his weight. Three cans of that beer for a man of his weight produce a theoretical maximum of approximately 97 mg%, assuming full absorption and no elimination. That peak is never actually reached. Elimination runs from the first drink, and approximately six and a half hours passed between his first beer and the first ASD test. Over that time, elimination would have brought his blood alcohol content well below 80 mg%.

Counsel also argued that the FAIL readings were explained by mouth alcohol. The applicant finished his last drink more than three hours before the stop, so the alcohol in his mouth did not come from a recent drink. It came from his stomach. The reflux brought it into his mouth in the minutes before each test and while he was blowing. A fifteen-minute wait after the last drink does nothing to address mouth alcohol from that source.

The adjudicator accepted Kyla Lee’s submissions and found that the applicant’s blood alcohol content was less than 80 mg% even though the ASD registered a FAIL. Having made that finding, the adjudicator did not need to consider anything further. The prohibition was revoked.

3. Decision of the Week

In R v Chodorowski, 2026 MBPC 73, the Provincial Court of Manitoba stayed charges of impaired driving causing bodily harm and over 80. The RCMP affiant on a production order for the accused’s hospital records deliberately withheld that he was in a romantic relationship with one of the nurses whose observations formed part of his grounds. The court held that this was an abuse of process in the residual category and a breach of s. 7 of the Charter. It held that a stay was the only remedy available.

On March 4, 2023, the accused was involved in a serious collision. The lead investigator, Cst. Chelmecki, interviewed her at the hospital and obtained information about her alcohol consumption. The officers later concluded that they could not rely on that statement because she had not been warned and cautioned. Cst. Chelmecki had not smelled alcohol on her. No witness at the scene reported smelling alcohol. He described the investigation as having reached a standstill. The hospital advised that police would need a production order to obtain Ms. Chodorowski’s medical records.

Cst. Chelmecki testified that in early April 2023, Cpl. Tost identified two nurses, Nurse Ballard and Nurse Wilson, and told him to interview them. Cst. Chelmecki then emailed the hospital and asked for those two nurses by name. He did not make a general request for the staff who had treated the accused. Both nurses provided evidence of alcohol consumption. Cpl. Tost became the affiant on the production order. He relied on summaries of the nurses’ statements and did not review the recordings himself. The production order issued on June 19, 2023.

Cpl. Tost first testified that he did not recall the conversation with Cst. Chelmecki. He later denied it outright. The court accepted Cst. Chelmecki’s account. His actions after the conversation were consistent with his evidence, including the targeted request that named only the two nurses. The court rejected Cpl. Tost’s denial as inaccurate.

As it turns out, Cpl. Tost and Nurse Ballard had been in a romantic relationship since February 2023. They began living together in October 2023. At the leave application in July 2024, the court granted leave to cross-examine Cpl. Tost but refused leave to cross-examine the nurses. It also left the nurses’ statements outside the scope of the affiant’s cross-examination. Cpl. Tost was cross-examined at the Garofoli hearing in December 2024. He did not disclose the relationship. The production order was upheld. In March 2025, the accused pleaded guilty to over 80 causing bodily harm.

In May 2025, the Crown disclosed the relationship. Crown counsel had learned of it through a chance encounter at a Canadian Tire store and told defence counsel immediately. The Crown is not alleged to have done anything wrong in this case. The Crown did not oppose the withdrawal of the guilty plea. The court permitted the accused to withdraw her plea in January 2026.

The court found that the relationship was material to assessing the source, circumstances and completeness of the information in the ITO. Its significance did not depend on proving that Nurse Ballard’s observations were inaccurate. The court made no finding that she supplied information to Cpl. Tost privately or that her observations were fabricated. Disclosure would have allowed the authorizing justice to assess her information knowing of her connection to the affiant. It would also have allowed scrutiny of how she came to be identified as a witness and what Cpl. Tost knew about her evidence beforehand. The possibility that the order might still have issued did not relieve Cpl. Tost of the obligation to disclose.

Cpl. Tost was an experienced affiant who could articulate his duty to make full, fair and frank disclosure. His explanation shifted from not considering the relationship relevant to not considering it at all. The court rejected that explanation. It found on a balance of probabilities that he deliberately withheld the relationship. It did not determine his motive.

On abuse of process, the court applied R v Babos, 2014 SCC 16. A production order is obtained ex parte, and the issuing justice cannot look beyond the four corners of the ITO. The process depends on the candour of the affiant. The court found that its own rulings on leave to cross-examine were made on a record that omitted material information, and that a direct line could be drawn from the non-disclosure to those rulings. It noted that the system did not self-correct. The affiant never came forward. The court indicated that “the ex parte authorization process cannot rely on chance public encounters as safeguards against miscarriages of justice.”

The court relied on R v Spagnoli and Shore, 2011 ONSC 4843, where police concealed the true source of an investigation in support of judicial authorizations and the truth also emerged by happenstance. That case involved systemic misconduct and indifference from senior officers, which was absent here. The analogy lay in withholding the information needed to scrutinize the foundation of the application and allowing the incomplete account to persist. Because the same material information was withheld at the authorization stage, at the leave application and at the Garofoli hearing, the court found an abuse of process in the residual category and a breach of s. 7.

At the first stage of Babos, the court found that the prejudice would continue if the prosecution went ahead. The prosecution had reached its current position through decisions made on a materially incomplete record. The Garofoli review was the safeguard designed to test the investigative power, and the omission prevented it from operating. The disclosure and the withdrawal of the plea addressed the informational disadvantage. They did not cure the consequences of the court permitting the prosecution to continue on a compromised authorization and review process. Even if the order could have issued on full disclosure, the institutional prejudice remained.

At the second stage, the court considered reopening the Garofoli application, reconsidering the limits on cross-examination, excluding the evidence, and excluding the evidence together with an express judicial denunciation. Reopening would allow the authorization to be assessed with knowledge of the relationship. The prejudice went further than whether there were sufficient grounds. The non-disclosure had shaped the court’s decisions about whom the defence could examine and what it could explore. Exclusion would remove the evidence, but the institutional concern extended to the sustained impairment of the safeguards governing how that evidence is obtained. The court concluded that even the combined alternatives would not adequately dissociate the justice system from the misconduct going forward.

At the balancing stage, the court weighed the victim’s life-altering injuries and the significant public safety interests in a drinking and driving bodily harm case. It also weighed the absence of any finding of fabrication, collusion or malice, the absence of other officers’ involvement, and the Crown’s professional and prompt conduct. The court found that the most serious aspect of the misconduct was that judges were repeatedly asked to make decisions without information they were entitled to receive. The public has a substantial interest in a judicial authorization process that functions as an effective check on investigative powers. The court concluded that the costs of continuing outweighed the benefit of adjudicating the charges on their merits and entered a stay of proceedings.

4. Kyla’s Insight

Thank you to Michael Dyck in Manitoba for sending me this one. The facts are wild. A police officer drafted an ITO relying on the observations of a nurse he was dating, then sat in the witness box at a Garofoli hearing while living with her and said nothing. The truth came out because of a chance encounter at a Canadian Tire.

It’s also pretty shocking that the nurse was willing to disclose private medical information to her partner and then to another police officer. The layers of privacy intrusion in this case should not be overlooked.

A stay was the only remedy that matched the harm in this case. Every alternative the Crown proposed addressed the evidence. The misconduct here reached further. Cpl. Tost’s omission infected the authorizing justice’s decision. It then infected the trial court’s ruling on leave to cross-examine, which kept the nurses out of the witness box. It then infected the Garofoli decision itself. The court asked to fashion a remedy was one of the bodies that had been misled. A remedy aimed only at the production order evidence leaves the damage to those judicial safeguards untouched.

Reopening the Garofoli application would have meant running the same review again with the same affiant whose candour had already failed every time it was tested. Exclusion would have left the Crown exactly where it would have been if Cpl. Tost had disclosed the relationship and the order had been refused. If the worst consequence of deliberate concealment is the same as the worst consequence of honesty, an affiant has no reason to be honest. Concealment then carries an upside and no added cost. Only a stay makes deliberate concealment from a judge more costly than candour.

Babos makes clear that a stay does not exist to punish the police. The question is whether the court must dissociate itself from the misconduct going forward. Express denunciation in reasons for judgment, followed by a trial that proceeds anyway, tells the public that a court will disapprove of a deliberately misled authorization process and then carry on with the prosecution it produced. When police keep judges in the dark through an authorization, a leave application and a Garofoli hearing, the condemnation has to carry a consequence in the case where it happened. Conduct this damaging to the justice system as a whole requires a stay to give the court’s condemnation any meaning.

Defence counsel should note what the court did not need to find. There was no finding that the nurse lied. There was no fabrication, no malice and no systemic problem. The Crown acted properly throughout. The charge was serious and the victim suffered life-altering injuries. The court still entered a stay. The deliberate withholding of material information from judges, persisting across several stages of the proceedings, was enough. The Crown routinely argues that a residual category stay requires fabrication, bad faith across an institution or an intention to secure a wrongful conviction. Chodorowski answers that argument.

The decision also matters for BC practice. Production orders and warrants for hospital records are routine in impaired driving causing bodily harm and death prosecutions here. Every one of them is obtained ex parte on the word of an affiant. Chodorowski is a Manitoba Provincial Court decision and does not bind a BC court. Its analysis applies Babos and R v Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, which bind every court in Canada.

The court commended Crown counsel for acting the moment he learned of the relationship, and he deserves that credit. The court also indicated that the authorization process cannot rely on chance encounters to prevent miscarriages of justice. Defence counsel cannot rely on chance either. Had the relationship been found before the Garofoli hearing, Ms. Chodorowski may never have entered a guilty plea. That is the point of this week’s tip.

5. Resources

Want to know more about impaired driving and Immediate Roadside Prohibitions in BC? Here are some helpful resources:

The BC Motor Vehicle Act: https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/96318_00

Criminal Code Offences Relating to Conveyances: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/page-46.html#h-121277

CanLII: https://www.canlii.org/

RoadSafetyBC: https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/transportation/driving-and-cycling/roadsafetybc

6. Contact Us

The police have their experts. You should have yours.

Charged with impaired driving? Get the lawyer who literally wrote the book on it. Call Kyla Lee at Acumen Law today. Visit our contact form or call 604-685-8889 or email kyla@vancouvercriminallaw.com

7. Featured Firm

Featured Firm: Acumen Law Corporation

Based in Vancouver, Acumen Law Corporation is one of British Columbia’s leading criminal defence firms, recognized across Canada for its work in impaired driving law. The firm’s lawyers have successfully defended thousands of Immediate Roadside Prohibitions, criminal impaired charges, and driving suspensions.

Kyla Lee, a partner at Acumen Law, is widely regarded as a national authority on DUI law. She has authored multiple legal textbooks, teaches DUI defence across North America, and regularly appears in the media explaining developments in driving law.

Acumen Law is known for its deep understanding of both the law and the science behind impaired driving cases. The team approaches every file with meticulous preparation and a commitment to protecting the rights of drivers across BC.

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