Welcome to British Columbia’s only weekly DUI law update newsletter. This newsletter contains the most cutting-edge information, the newest case law, and helpful practice tips for DUI defence in BC.
Authored by Kyla Lee, BC’s Impaired Driving Update is released weekly on Thursdays.
What’s inside:
- Impaired Driving Defence Tip
- ADP of the Week
- Decision of the Week
- Kyla’s Insight
- Resources
1. Impaired Driving Defence Tip
When police believe a driver is impaired by drugs, they can call in an officer trained as a drug recognition expert. That officer runs a twelve-step evaluation and forms an opinion about whether the driver is impaired and what kind of drug is responsible. If the opinion is that the driver is impaired, the driver can be served with a 90-day driving prohibition.
The evaluation only works because it is standardized. Every step is done the same way and in the same order, and each one tests the opinion formed in the step before. The reliability of the final opinion depends on the officer actually completing the sequence.
In a recent file of mine, the officer did not complete it. There was no breath test. The ingestion examination was not performed. The dark room examination, where the officer checks how the driver’s pupils react under different lighting, was not done because the lights in the room were not working. The officer reached a conclusion about the drug category anyway and issued the prohibition.
I argued that an opinion drawn from an unfinished evaluation cannot be relied upon. The steps that were left out are the ones meant to confirm the result, and without them there was nothing to show the conclusion was sound. This echoes recent case law, including R. v. Wilson, 2026 ONCJ 211.
2. ADP of the Week
The applicant was issued a 90-day driving prohibition after a drug recognition evaluation concluded that the applicant was impaired by a drug.
The applicant was taken through a drug recognition evaluation by a trained officer. A drug recognition evaluation is a standardized twelve-step process. The steps are set out in the regulations, and each one is meant to be performed in a set way and in a set order.
In this case, the evaluation was not completed. No breath test was taken. The ingestion examination was not performed. The dark room examination, where the officer assesses the applicant’s pupils under different lighting conditions, was not conducted because the lights in the room were not working. The officer reached a conclusion about the drug category and issued the prohibition despite the missing steps.
Kyla Lee argued that section 94.6 of the Motor Vehicle Act requires a drug recognition evaluation to be performed in accordance with the regulations. The regulations prescribe the steps that make up the evaluation, including the steps the officer did not perform. Because the evaluation did not conform to the regulations, the statutory requirement for the prohibition was not met.
The adjudicator agreed and the prohibition was revoked.
3. Decision of the Week
In R v Rumbles, 2026 BCCA 410, the BC Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal from convictions for dangerous driving causing death, impaired driving causing death and over 80 causing death. The defence rested on a medical theory about diabetes and accidental post-driving ingestion of alcohol.
Mr. Rumbles is an insulin-dependent diabetic. He had taken his long-acting insulin the night before his accident, had last eaten the previous afternoon, skipped breakfast, packed no food and left his glucose monitor at home.
He stopped for fuel on a journey from Alberta and into BC. When did so, he purchased liquor, including a bottle of vodka. He said the vodka was for his mother-in-law and that he had stopped drinking hard liquor after a diabetic ketoacidosis event in 2018. He bought no food.
As the day went on, he began to feel lethargic, tired and sweaty. He drank a White Claw around Clearwater and a second before Kamloops. He could not explain why he opened the first one. His last memory was a text to his wife at 4:52 p.m. saying he was approaching Salmon Arm.
What followed was a long stretch of erratic driving on a circuitous route. He drove past his turnoff, doubled back through Salmon Arm and later turned around again. A driver called 911 at 5:51 p.m. to report him crossing the lines. Two more witnesses watched him veer across the highway and try to make a U-turn across a concrete median. He then reversed into another vehicle. That driver described an unsteady gait, glassy eyes and slurred speech, and thought he looked like a stroke victim. He drove away without answering her.
Eventually, as he continued, Mr. Rumbles crossed the centre line and hit another vehicle head-on. The occupant of that vehicle was killed.
Paramedics found the accused awake and talking. He told them he had “a drink a while ago.” His blood glucose at 8:04 p.m. was 9.3, which caused the paramedic no concern. Police found the vodka bottle three-quarters empty. His BAC at the time of analysis was 186 mg%, and the Crown’s forensic alcohol specialist put it between 213 mg% and 239 mg% at the time of the collision.
The accused testified he did not remember drinking the vodka but accepted he “must have.” He also testified that no doctor had ever warned him about the dangers of low blood glucose.
The defence called Dr. Gregory Kline, an endocrinologist. His opinion was that the accused had all the prerequisites for an insulin-induced hypoglycemic event, that it was possible he was hypoglycemic during the afternoon, and that it was plausible a moderate hypoglycemic state impaired his judgment enough that he drank the vodka without intending to. He also offered explanations for why the glucose reading was 9.3 shortly after the crash. On patient education, he said the information given to insulin patients is “highly variable.”
The trial judge found the accused generally credible but rejected his evidence that he had never been taught about low blood glucose. Given his long history with diabetes, the 2018 hospitalization, his knowledge that his levels should be between four and seven, his many contacts with health care providers, and his intelligence and self-interest, it “defie[d] credulity.” The judge gave very little weight to Dr. Kline’s evidence on patient education because nothing was known about the scope, basis or recency of the experience it rested on.
The judge gave little weight to the hypoglycemia hypothesis as a whole. The opinion relied on the rejected evidence about education. Dr. Kline never interviewed the accused, his doctors or his family. It was unclear whether he had read the medical records or was only told about them. He had read portions of a police report but not heard the witnesses, and he did not know the accused’s insulin schedule or whether he had departed from it. The judge found the accused was not moderately or severely hypoglycemic when he drank the vodka and convicted on impaired and over 80.
The accused raised four grounds. The Court of Appeal rejected three and found error on the fourth, but applied the curative proviso.
The Court held the rejection of the accused’s evidence on hypoglycemia education was a common-sense inference grounded in the record, which is exactly the evidence-based and context-specific expected of a trial judge. It was not speculation. The trial judge’s comment that there was no evidence from the accused’s care providers did not reverse the burden. The judge did not reject the evidence for lack of corroboration. He rejected it as implausible on the whole of the record.
Mr. Rumbles also argued that the judge erred in how much weight was given to the expert opinion of Dr. Kline. The Court treated this as an invitation to reweigh expert evidence and declined. Dr. Kline’s failure to interview anyone mattered because, as he conceded in cross-examination, he could only speak to the plausibility of his hypothesis and could not assess the probability that the accused’s own unimpaired judgment led him to drink the vodka. He also said there was no evidence of overt hypoglycemic cognitive impairment in the early afternoon. The education point mattered because Dr. Kline himself listed it as one of the prerequisites in his direct evidence. Once the judge found the accused had been educated about hypoglycemia, the voluntary-consumption explanation became more likely, and the judge could reduce the weight of the opinion under Abbey. The Court also noted the 9.3 glucose reading within minutes of the collision, and read the trial judge as finding that drinking the vodka was the culmination of a day of poor decisions.
The accused argued the trial judge should have given notice of the inferences he planned to draw about the accused’s knowledge and about Dr. Kline’s assumptions. Relying on R. v. Jajja, 2024 BCCA 125, the Court held the rule does not require a judge to effectively reopen the trial so witnesses can respond to inferences on an issue everyone knew was contested.
The defence did succeed in its arguments on the dangerous driving conviction, although only in principle. The actus reus of dangerous driving is about the manner of driving, not its consequences. The trial judge misunderstood the scope of the admission, which only covered the driving from 5:51 p.m. onward. He cited no evidence that the driving in the early afternoon was dangerous and instead treated the consumption of two White Claws as the dangerous act, even though he had found the accused was not impaired by them. That was an error of law.
The Crown argued the error was harmless. The Court disagreed, since the conviction rested on the erroneous early-afternoon analysis. But it found that the admitted erratic driving from 5:51 p.m., combined with the upheld finding that the accused voluntarily drank three-quarters of a bottle of vodka while driving, made a conviction inevitable. The appeal was dismissed.
4. Kyla’s Insight
Medical defences to impaired driving charges are not impossible, but they are expensive and hard, and the ones that fail usually fail for the same reason this one did. The theory depended largely on the accused’s own testimony, and once the judge disbelieved him on one important point, the expert opinion had no basis in fact to support the conclusions the Court was asked to draw.
Look at what Dr. Kline could actually say. He could say hypoglycemia was possible and that impaired judgment from hypoglycemia was plausible. He could not say when it started, he conceded there was no evidence of overt cognitive impairment in the early afternoon, and he could not weigh his theory against the obvious alternative that the accused simply chose to drink. A defence expert who can only speak to plausibility is not going to carry a reasonable doubt when the rest of the evidence points the other way.
The paramedic’s glucose reading of 9.3 was the single most important piece of objective evidence on the issue, and it was normal. The accused bought a large bottle of vodka on a solo drive, drank two seltzers on an empty stomach while feeling unwell, and could not explain why. Every one of those facts made the voluntary explanation more likely. When a medical theory needs the judge to look past the hard data and accept a string of assumptions, it starts to look like a theory reverse-engineered from the result.
The foundation problems were also avoidable. The expert did not interview the client or his family and did not speak to the treating physicians. Nobody could say whether he had even read the medical records. If you want an expert to tell a court that your client did not know about hypoglycemia, or that his insulin regime put him at risk that day, the records and the treating doctors are where that evidence lives. Without them, the opinion is only as strong as your client’s credibility, and you have handed the Crown a single target to aim at.
None of this means counsel should shy away from medical evidence. It means the work has to be done before the theory is chosen, not after. Get the records, get the timeline, find out what the objective data shows, and then decide whether the medical explanation fits. If the best your expert can offer is that something was possible, a marginal medical defence may do more harm than good by tying the outcome to whether the judge believes the accused.
There is helpful language for counsel in the dangerous driving analysis. The Court confirmed in clear terms that the actus reus is about how the vehicle was driven. Drinking behind the wheel, or driving while feeling unwell, is not dangerous driving unless the Crown proves the driving itself was dangerous at that time. That point will come up again, and Rumbles is now binding authority for it in BC.
5. Resources
Want to know more about impaired driving and Immediate Roadside Prohibitions in BC? Here are some helpful resources:
The BC Motor Vehicle Act: https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/96318_00
Criminal Code Offences Relating to Conveyances: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/page-46.html#h-121277
CanLII: https://www.canlii.org/
RoadSafetyBC: https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/transportation/driving-and-cycling/roadsafetybc
6. Contact Us
The police have their experts. You should have yours.
Charged with impaired driving? Get the lawyer who literally wrote the book on it. Call Kyla Lee at Acumen Law today. Visit our contact form or call 604-685-8889 or email kyla@vancouvercriminallaw.com
7. Featured Firm
Featured Firm: Acumen Law Corporation
Based in Vancouver, Acumen Law Corporation is one of British Columbia’s leading criminal defence firms, recognized across Canada for its work in impaired driving law. The firm’s lawyers have successfully defended thousands of Immediate Roadside Prohibitions, criminal impaired charges, and driving suspensions.
Kyla Lee, a partner at Acumen Law, is widely regarded as a national authority on DUI law. She has authored multiple legal textbooks, teaches DUI defence across North America, and regularly appears in the media explaining developments in driving law.
Acumen Law is known for its deep understanding of both the law and the science behind impaired driving cases. The team approaches every file with meticulous preparation and a commitment to protecting the rights of drivers across BC.
